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Abstract
Consider the following process on a network: Each agent initially holds
either opinion blue or red ; then, in each round, each agent looks at two
random neighbors and, if the two have the same opinion, the agent adopts
it. This process is known as the 2-Choices dynamics and is arguably the
most basic non-trivial opinion dynamics modeling voting behavior on social
networks. Despite its apparent simplicity, 2-Choices has been analytically
characterized only on networks with a strong expansion property – under
assumptions on the initial configuration that establish it as a fast majority
consensus protocol.
In this work, we aim at contributing to the understanding of the
2-Choices dynamics by considering its behavior on a class of networks
with core-periphery structure, a well-known topological assumption in
social networks. In a nutshell, assume that a densely-connected subset of
agents, the core, holds a different opinion from the rest of the network,
the periphery. Then, depending on the strength of the cut between the
core and the periphery, a phase-transition phenomenon occurs: Either
the core’s opinion rapidly spreads among the rest of the network, or a
metastability phase takes place, in which both opinions coexist in the
network for superpolynomial time. The interest of our result is twofold.
On the one hand, by looking at the 2-Choices dynamics as a simplistic
model of competition among opinions in social networks, our theorem
sheds light on the influence of the core on the rest of the network, as a
function of the core’s connectivity towards the latter. On the other hand,
to the best of our knowledge, we provide the first analytical result which
shows a heterogeneous behavior of a simple dynamics as a function of
structural parameters of the network. Finally, we validate our theoretical
predictions with extensive experiments on real networks.
∗Work carried out at Max Planck Institute for Informatics, Saarbrücken, Germany.
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1 Introduction
Opinion dynamics (for short, dynamics) are simplistic mathematical models for
the competition of agents’ opinions on social networks [MNT14]. In a nutshell,
given a network where each agent initially supports an opinion (from a finite
set), a dynamics is a simple rule which agents apply to update their opinion
based on that of their neighbors. Proving theoretical results on dynamics is a
challenging mathematical endeavor which may require the development of new
analytical techniques [BCO+16, BCN+15].
As dynamics are aimed at modeling the spread of opinions, a central issue
is to understand under which conditions the network reaches a consensus, i.e.
a state where the whole network is taken over by a single opinion [MT17].
In this respect, most efforts have been directed toward obtaining topology-
independent results, which disregard the initial opinions’ placement on the
network [BCN+17, BCN+16, CRRS17].
The trivial example of dynamics is the so-called Voter Model, in which in
each round each agent copies the opinion of a random neighbor. This classical
model arises in physics and computer science and, despite its apparent simplicity,
some properties have been proven only recently [Lig09, HP01, BGKMT16].
The simplest non-trivial example is then arguably the 2-Choices dynamics, in
which agents choose two random neighbors and switch to their opinion only if
they coincide [CER14] (see Definition 3.2). Still, the analysis of the 2-Choices
dynamics has been limited to networks with good expansion properties, and
the theoretical guarantees provided so far are essentially independent from the
positioning of initial opinions [CER+15].
In this work, we aim at contributing to the general understanding of the
evolution of simple opinion dynamics in richer classes of network topologies by
studying their behavior theoretically and empirically on core-periphery networks.
Core-periphery networks are typical economic and social networks which exhibit a
core-periphery structure, a well-known concept in the analysis of social networks
in sociology and economics [BE00, DJ10], which defines a bipartition of the
agents into core and periphery, such that certain key features are identified.
We consider an axiomatic framework that has been introduced in previous
work in computer science [ALP+14], which is based on two parameters only,
dominance and robustness. The ranges for these parameters in the theorems
we obtain include the values of the parameters in the the experimental part of
this work, in which our results are validated on important datasets of real-world
networks.
Intuitively, the core is a set of agents that dominates the rest of the network.
In order to do so, it maintains a large amount of external influence on the
periphery, higher than or at least comparable to the internal influence that
the periphery has on itself. Similarly, to maintain its robustness, namely to
hold its position and stick to its opinions, the core must be able to resist the
“outside” pressure in the form of external influence. To achieve that, the core
must maintain a higher (or at least not significantly lower) influence on itself than
the external influence exerted on it by the periphery. Both, high dominance and
high robustness, are essential for the core to be able to maintain its dominating
status in the network. Moreover, it seems natural for the core size to be as
small as possible. In social-network terms this is motivated by the idea that if
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membership in a social elite entails benefits, then keeping the elite as small as
possible increases the share for each of its members.
The above requirements are formalized in the following axioms [ALP+14].
Given a network G = (V,E) and two subsets of agents A,B ⊆ V , let c(A,B) =
{(u, v) |u ∈ A, v ∈ B, (u, v) ∈ E} be the set of cut edges between A and B. The
density of a set X ⊆ V is defined as δ(X) = |c(X,X)|/|X|. Let cd and cr be
two positive constants and let V = C ∪˙ P, where C is the set of agents in the
core and P the set of agents in the periphery. Then, the axioms are as follows:
• Dominance: The core’s influence dominates the periphery, i.e. |c(C,P)| >
cd · |c(P,P)|.
• Robustness: The core can withstand outside influence from the periphery,
i.e. |c(C, C)| > cr · |c(P, C)|.
• Compactness: The core is a minimal set satisfying the above dominance
and robustness axioms.1
• Density : The core is denser than the whole network, i.e. δ(C) > δ(V ).
Our analytical and experimental results leverage on the dominance and robustness
axioms only (see Definition 3.1), showing how assumptions on the values of cd
and cr are sufficient to provide a good characterization of the behavior of the
dynamics.
We consider the 2-Choices dynamics in core-periphery networks when starting
from natural initial configurations in which the core and the periphery have
different opinions. Our experiments on real-world networks show that the
execution of the 2-Choices dynamics tends to fall mainly within two opposite
kinds of possible behavior:
Consensus: The opinion of the core spreads in the periphery and takes
over the network in a short time.
Metastability: The periphery resists and, although the opinion of the core
may continuously “infect” agents in the periphery, most of
them retain the initial opinion.
By comprehending the underlying principles which govern the aforementioned
phenomena, we aim at a twofold contribution:
• We seek for the first results on basic non-trivial opinion dynamics, such
as 2-Choices, in order to characterize its behavior (i) on new classes of
topologies other than networks with strong expansion and (ii) as a function
of the process’ initial configuration.
• We look for a dynamic explanation for the axioms of core-periphery net-
works: By investigating the interplay between the core-periphery axioms
and the evolution of simple opinion dynamics, we want to get insights on
dynamical properties which are implicitly responsible for causing social and
economic agents to form networks with a core-periphery structure.
1The core is a minimal set and not necessarily the minimum.
3
Original Contribution
In order to understand what network key properties are responsible for the
aforementioned dichotomy between a long metastable and a fast consensus
behavior, we theoretically investigate a class of networks belonging to the core-
periphery model.
To further simplify the theoretical analysis, in Theorem 3.4 we initially
consider the setting in which agents in the core are stubborn, i.e. they don’t
change their initial opinion.2 We later show, in Corollary 3.7, how to substitute
this assumption with milder hypotheses on the core’s structure.
The common difficulty in analyzing opinion dynamics is the lack of general
tools which allow to rigorously handle their intrinsic nonlinearity and stochastic
dependencies [MNT14, CER14, BCN+16, CRRS17, MT17]. Hence, the difficulty
usually resides in identifying some crucial key quantities for which ad-hoc
analytical bounds on the expected evolution are derived. Our approach is
yet another instance of such efforts: In Section 3 we provide a careful bound on
the expected change of the number of agents supporting a given opinion. Together
with the use of Chernoff bounds, we obtain a concentration of probability around
the expected evolution. Rather surprisingly, our analysis on the concentrated
probabilistic behavior turns out to identify a phase transition phenomenon
(Corollaries 3.5 and 3.7):
There exists a universal constant c? =
√
2−1
2 such that, on any
core-periphery network of n agents, if the dominance parameter cd
is greater than c?, an almost-consensus is reached within O(log n)
rounds, with high probability;3 otherwise, if cd is less than c?, a
metastable phase in which the periphery retains its opinion takes
place, namely, although the opinion of the core may continuously
“infect” agents in the periphery, most of them will retain the initial
opinion for nω(1) rounds, with high probability.
We validate our theoretical predictions by extensive experiments on real-
world networks chosen from a variety of domains including social networks,
communication networks, road networks, and the web. We thoroughly discuss
our results in Section 4, however, we briefly want to highlight the key results
of our experiments in the following. The experiments showed some weaknesses
of the core extraction heuristic used in [ALP+14]. To avoid those drawbacks,
we designed a new core extraction heuristic which repeatedly calculates densest-
subgraph approximations. Our experimental results on real-world networks
show a strong correlation with the theoretical predictions made by our model.
They further suggests an empirical threshold larger than c? for which the
2We remark that the evolution of the 2-Choices dynamics, together with the latter
assumption on the stubbornness of the core, can be regarded as a SIS-like epidemic
model [Het00, EJN02]. In such a model, the network is the subgraph induced by the periphery
and the infection probability is given by the 2-Choices dynamics, which also determines a
certain probability of spontaneous infection (that in the original process corresponds to the
fact that agents in the periphery interact with agents in the core). This interpretation of our
results may be of independent interest.
3We further emphasize that our analysis is not only mean-field. In addition to describing
how the process evolves in expectation, we show that the process does not deviate significantly
from how it behaves in expectation with high probability (w.h.p.), i.e. with probability at least
1−O(n−c) for some constant c > 0.
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aforementioned correlation is even stronger. We discuss which aspects of the
current theoretical model may be responsible for such discrepancy, and thus
identify possibilities for a model which is even more accurate.
We remark that our investigation represents an original contribution with
respect to the line of research on consensus discussed in Section 2, as it shows a
drastic change in behavior for the 2-Choices dynamics on an arguably typical
broad family of social networks which is not directly characterized by expansion
properties. In particular, the convergence to the core’s opinion in our theoretical
and experimental results is a highly nontrivial fact when compared to previous
analytical works (see Section 4 for more details).
Overall, our theoretical and experimental results highlight new potential
relations between the typical core-periphery structure in social and economic
networks and the behavior of simple opinion dynamics – both, in terms of getting
insights into the driving forces that may determine certain structures to appear
frequently in real-world networks, as well as in terms of the possibility to provide
analytical predictions on the outcome of simplistic models of interaction in
networks of agents.
2 Related Work
Simple models of interaction between pairs of nodes in a network are studied since
the first half of the 20th century in statistical mechanics where mathematical
models of ferromagnetism led to the study of Ising and Potts models [Lig06].
A different perspective later came from diverse sciences such as economics and
sociology where averaging-based opinion dynamics such as the DeGroot model
were investigated [Fre05, Har59, Deg74, GJ10, Jac21].
More recently, computer scientists have started to contribute to the investi-
gating of opinion dynamics for mainly two reasons. First, with the advent of
the Internet, huge amounts of of data from social networks are now available.
As the law of large numbers often allows to assume crude simplifications on the
agents’ behavior in such networks [DJ10], investigating opinion dynamics allows
for a more fine-grained understanding of the evolution of such systems. Second
and somehow complementary to the previous motivation, technological systems
of computationally simple agents, such as mobile sensor networks, often require
the design of computationally primitive protocols. These protocols end up being
surprisingly similar, if not identical, to many opinion dynamics which emerge
from a simplistic mathematical modeling of agents’ behavior in fields such as
sociology, biology, and economy [HP01, BCN+15, MT17].
A substantial line of work has recently been devoted to investigating the use of
simple opinion dynamics for solving the plurality consensus problem in distributed
computing. The goal in this problem setting is for each node to be aware of
the most frequent initially supported opinion after a certain time [DGM+11,
BCN+17, BCN+15, BCN+16, GP16, BFGK16, CR16, CDFR16, CRR16]. The
seminal work by Hassin and Peleg [HP01] introduced for the first time the study
of a synchronous-time version of the Voter Model in statistical mechanics. In this
model, in each discrete-time round, each node looks at a random neighbor and
copies her opinion. The Voter Model is considered the trivial opinion dynamics,
in the sense that it is arguably the simplest conceivable rule by which nodes may
meaningfully update their opinion as a function of their neighbors’ opinion. Many
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properties of this process are understood by known mathematical techniques
such as an elegant duality with the coalescing random walk process [AF02]. In
particular, it is known that the Voter Model is not a fast dynamics as for the
time it takes before consensus on one opinion is reached in the network. For that
reason, the 2-Choices dynamics has been considered [CER14]. In such dynamics,
in each round, each node looks at the opinion of two random neighbors and, if
these two are the same, adopts it. This process can arguably be considered the
simplest non-trivial type of opinion dynamics.
The authors of [CER14] consider any initial configuration in which each node
is supporting one out of two possible opinions. They proved that in such a
configuration, under the assumption that the initial bias (i.e. advantage of an
opinion) is greater than a function of the network’s expansion (measured in terms
of the second eigenvalue of the network) [HLW06], the whole network will support
the initially most frequent opinion with high probability after a polylogarithmic
number of rounds. The results of [CER14] on the 2-Choices dynamics were later
refined with milder assumptions on the initial bias with respect to the network’s
expansion [CER+15] and generalized to more opinions [CRRS17]. Until now, the
2-Choices dynamics constitutes one of the few processes whose behavior has been
characterized on non-complete topologies – however, assuming good expansion
properties. Their techniques should be easily adaptable in order to handle similar
dynamics, such as the 3-Majority dynamics [BCN+17, BCN+16, GL17].
On a different note, for the deterministic Majority dynamics where in each
round each node updates her opinion with the most frequent one among her
neighbors: Substantial effort has been devoted to investigating how small the
cardinality of a monopoly can be, i.e. a set of nodes supporting a given opinion O
such that, when running the Majority dynamics, eventually the network reaches
consensus on O [Pel98, Pel02]. The previous line of investigation has focused
on determining the existence of network classes on which the monopoly has a
size which is upper bounded by a small function. This question has been settled
by [Ber01], who proved the existence of a family of networks with constant-size
monopoly. We emphasize that this line of investigation is peculiar as it deals
with existential questions related to specific network classes, as opposed to
the typical research questions that we discussed so far, which ask for general
characterizations of the behavior of the considered process.
Recently, a more systematic and general study of opinion dynamics has been
carried out in [MNT14, BCO+16, MT17]. It characterizes the evolution and
other mathematical aspects of dynamics – such as the Majority dynamics, the
Voter Model, the DeGroot model, and others – on different network classes, such
as Erdős-Rényi random networks and expander networks. We follow [MT17] in
adopting the term “opinion dynamics” to refer to the class of processes discussed
above.
Finally, a similar perspective to ours has been adopted in [LAH07], where
the authors show a phase-transition in a mean-field analysis of the behavior
of deterministic majority in an asynchronous-update model, in which only few
nodes update their opinion at each round, on “coupled fully connected networks”
composed of overlapping complete graphs.
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Core-Periphery model
It has long been observed in sociology that many economic and social networks
exhibit a core-periphery structure [SK79, BE00, RPFM14, ZMN15], namely, it
is generally possible to group nodes into two classes, a core and a periphery, such
that the former exhibits a dense internal topology while the latter is sparse and
loosely connected, with specific properties relating the two. Such architectural
principle has been linked, for example, to the easiness with which individuals solve
routing problems in networks subject to the small-world phenomenon [DJ10].
The qualitative notion of core-periphery structure was translated into quanti-
tative relations in the axiomatic approach of [ALP+14], which later also applied
the algorithmic properties that follow from the core-periphery structure to the
design of efficient distributed networks [ABLP17]. In some sense, our theoreti-
cal and empirical results may be regarded as a functional justification for the
presence of a core-periphery structure in networks, as the latter turns out to
play a decisive role in determining a certain kind of evolution for basic opinion
dynamics such as the 2-Choices.
3 Theoretical Analysis
We give a formal analysis of the 2-Choices dynamics on a specific network
topology, i.e. on Core-Periphery networks. We use colors instead of opinions
to facilitate intuitive understanding of the analysis. Specifically, we consider
the setting in which the agents belonging to the core C initially support the
color blue while the remaining agents, from the periphery P, support the color
red. We show that, depending on the value of some parameters describing the
core-periphery structure of the network, either the opinion of the core rapidly
spreads among almost the whole network (Almost-consensus: almost all the
agents support the blue color after a few rounds) or most of the periphery resists
for a long time (Metastability : most agents in P remain red).
First, we formally describe our characterization of Core-Periphery networks
and of the 2-Choices dynamics. Then, we prove two technical results which will
be exploited in order to provide a rigorous analysis of the 2-Choices dynamics
on Core-Periphery networks.
Definition 3.1. For every n and ε, cr, cd ∈ R+, with 1/2 6 ε 6 1, we define an
(n, ε, cr, cd)-Core-Periphery network G = (C ∪˙ P, E) as a network with |C| = nε
and |P| = n and such that: (i) for each agent u ∈ C, it holds that |N(u) ∩ C| =
cr · |N(u)∩P|; (ii) for each agent v ∈ P, it holds that |N(v)∩C| = cd · |N(v)∩P|;
N(v) is the set of neighbors of agent v. We call C the core and P the periphery.
The definition we just provided matches the requirements of the core-periphery
structure as axiomatized by Avin et al. [ALP+14]. However, observe that it is
more restrictive: the values cr and cd define properties that hold for each agent
of the network and not only globally, i.e. for the partition induced by the core.
The 2-Choices dynamics can be formally described as follows.
Definition 3.2 (2-Choices dynamics). Given a network G = (V,E) with an
initial binary coloring of the agents c : V 7→ {red, blue}, the 2-Choices dynamics
proceeds in synchronous rounds: in each round, each agent u chooses two neigh-
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bors v, w uniformly at random with replacement; if c(v) = c(w), then u updates
its own color to c(v), otherwise u keeps its color.
In order to analyze the 2-Choices dynamics on Core-Periphery networks, we
present a more general technical result that will be exploited later. In fact, both
in the analysis of the almost-consensus and of the metastability, we can focus on
the worst-case scenario for the core and for the periphery: Each time an agent
in one of the two sets picks a neighbor in the other set, that neighbor has the
initial color of the set it belongs to. Alternatively, such a scenario can be seen
as the following variant of the 2-Choices dynamics.
Definition 3.3 (Biased-2-Choices(p, σ) dynamics). Let p ∈ [0, 1] be a constant
and let σ ∈ {red, blue} be a color. We define the Biased-2-Choices(p, σ) dynamics
as a variation of the 2-Choices dynamics: Every time an agent picks a neighbor,
with probability p that neighbor supports color σ regardless of its actual color.
The technical result we present considers a network of agents running the
Biased-2-Choices(p, σ) dynamics, all having the same initial color different from
σ. Informally, it shows that there exists a value p? such that if the agents are
running the Biased-2-Choices(p, σ) dynamics with p > p?, then the color σ
rapidly spreads among almost the whole network, while if p < p?, then most
of the network does not support the color σ for a superpolynomial number of
rounds.
For a set of agents A, let the volume of A be defined as vol(A) =
∑
v∈A dv,
where dv is the degree of v.
Theorem 3.4. Let G = (V,E) be a network of n agents such that each agent v
has a color σv and dv = ω(log n) neighbors. Let p ∈ [0, 1] be a constant. Then,
starting from a configuration where all agents initially support the red color and
letting the agents run Biased-2-Choices(p, blue), it holds that:
• Almost-consensus: If p > 3− 2√2, then the agents reach a configuration
such that the volume of agents supporting the blue color is (1−o(1))vol(V )
within O(log n) rounds, w.h.p.
• Metastability: If p < 3− 2√2, then the volume of the blue agents never
exceeds 1−3p4(1−p)vol(V ) for any poly(n) number of rounds, w.h.p.
Proof. Let B(t) be the set of blue agents and R(t) = V \B(t) be the set of red
agents at time t. For any agent v, let NR(v) = N(v) ∩ R(t) be the set of red
neighbors and NB(v) = N(v) ∩B(t) the set of blue neighbors of v. Furthermore,
let r(t)v be the number of red neighbors of v at time t, i.e. r
(t)
v = |NR(v)|.
Let φ(t)v = r(t)v /dv be the fraction of red agents in the neighborhood of v; let
φ(t)
min
= minv∈V φ
(t)
v and φ(t)max = maxv∈V φ
(t)
v be, respectively, the minimum
and maximum fractions of red neighbors among all agents in V . Let c(t) ∈
{red, blue}n be the configuration of the colors of the agents at time t. In the
following, for the sake of readability, whenever we omit the time index, we refer
to the value at time t, e.g. φv stands for φ
(t)
v . Similarly, we concisely denote with
PR (v) = P(v ∈ R(t+1) | c(t)) the probability that agent v will be supporting the
red color in the next round of the Biased-2-Choices(p, blue), i.e.
PR (v) =
{
1− (p+ (1− p)(1− φv))2 if v ∈ R,
(1− p)2φ2v if v ∈ B.
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Furthermore, notice that:
min
w∈R
PR (w) = 1−
(
p+ (1− p)(1− φmin)
)2
,
min
w∈B
PR (w) = (1− p)2φ2min.
Given a configuration c(t), we can give a lower bound for the expected fraction
of red neighbors of any agent v as follows:
E
[
φ(t+1)v
∣∣∣ c(t)] = 1
dv
 ∑
w∈NR(v)
PR (w) +
∑
w∈NB(v)
PR (w)

> 1
dv
(
|NR(v)|min
w∈R
PR (w) + |NB(v)|min
w∈B
PR (w)
)
=
rv
dv
min
w∈R
PR (w) +
(
1− rv
dv
)
min
w∈B
PR (w)
=
rv
dv
(
1− (p+ (1− p)(1− φ
min
)
)2)
+
(
1− rv
dv
)
(1− p)2φ2
min
=
rv
dv
(
1− (p+ (1− p)(1− φ
min
)
)2 − (1− p)2φ2
min
)
+ (1− p)2φ2
min
> φmin
(
1− (p+ (1− p)(1− φmin))2 − (1− p)2φ2min)+ (1− p)2φ2min
= φmin
(
1− (p+ (1− p)(1− φmin))2 + (1− p)2(1− φmin)φmin)
= φ
min
(
1− 2(1− p)2φ2
min
+ (1− p)(3− p)φ
min
− 1) .
Note that we could cancel out 1 and −1, however, leaving them facilitates the
analysis. In the steps above, we can lower bound rv/dv because its coefficient, i.e.
(1−(p+(1−p)(1−φmin))2− (1−p)2φ2min), is non-negative for any p, φmin ∈ [0, 1].
Conversely, we can upper bound the expectation using φ
max
, i.e.
E
[
φ(t+1)v
∣∣∣ c(t)] 6 φmax (1− 2 (1− p)2 φ2max + (1− p)(3− p)φmax − 1) .
Notice that the lower and the upper bound for the expectation have the same
form. In fact, defining the functions
f(φ) = 2 (1− p)2 φ2 − (1− p)(3− p)φ+ 1,
g(φ) = φ(1− f(φ)),
the lower and the upper bound for the expectation can respectively be written
as g(φmin) and g(φmax). Thus, analyzing f(φ), we can see for which values of p
the function g(φ) is increasing or decreasing.
Before proving the almost-consensus and the metastability configurations
that can be reached by the agents running the Biased-2-Choices(p, blue), we
study f(φ) in order to characterize the bounds for the expectation. The roots of
f(φ) are in 3−p±
√
p2−6p+1
4(1−p) and the derivative of f(φ) is
f ′(φ) = 4 (1− p)2 φ− (1− p)(3− p).
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It follows that f(φ) has a minimum point in φ¯ = 3−p4(1−p) . Moreover, the sign
of f(φ¯) exclusively depends on p. In fact
f(φ¯) > 0 if p > 3− 2
√
2, (1)
f(φ¯) < 0 if p < 3− 2
√
2, (2)
since in (1) the discriminant of f(φ) is negative, while in (2) it is positive.
Almost-consensus. Let p > 3 − 2√2. Let f(φ¯) = ε be the local minimum
of f . Notice that ε is positive because of (1) and it is a constant since it only
depends on p and φ¯, which are both constants.
Due to the convexity of f(φ), it holds that f(φ) > ε. Thus, for any v ∈ V ,
we have that
E
[
φ(t+1)v
∣∣∣ c(t)] 6 g(φmax) = φmax(1− f(φmax)) 6 φmax(1− ε),
as ε > 0. Thus, we can apply the multiplicative form of the Chernoff bounds
[DP09, Theorem 1.1] and get that
P
(
φ(t+1)v > (1− ε2)φmax
∣∣∣ c(t))
= P
(
φ(t+1)v > (1 + ε)(1− ε)φmax
∣∣∣ c(t))
6 P
(
φ(t+1)v > (1 + ε)E
[
φ(t+1)v
∣∣∣ c(t)] ∣∣∣ c(t))
= P
(
r(t+1)v > (1 + ε)dvE
[
φ(t+1)v
∣∣∣ c(t)] ∣∣∣ c(t))
6 e−(1+ε)2dvφmax (1−ε)/3 6 e−2 logn = n−2,
where in the last inequality we can assume that the configuration c(t) is such
that φ
max
> 6 logn(1+ε)2(1−ε)dv = o(1), since dv = ω(log n) by definition. Thus, using
the union bound over all the agents, we get that φ(t+1)
max
6 (1 − ε2)φ
max
w.h.p.
Formally,
P
(
∃v ∈ V : φ(t+1)v > (1− ε2)φmax
∣∣∣ c(t))
6
∑
v∈V
P
(
φ(t+1)v > (1− ε2)φmax
∣∣∣ c(t)) 6∑
v∈V
n−2 = n−1.
Such a multiplicative decrease rate of the expected maximum fraction of red
neighbors implies that φ
max
is in the order of o(1) within O(log n) rounds of the
Biased-2-Choices(p, blue). Again, applying the union bound, we get that this
happens w.h.p.
Metastability. Let p < 3− 2√2. Define f(φ¯) = −ε to be the local minimum
of f . Recall that ε is positive because of (2) and it is a constant since it only
depends on the constants p and φ¯.
Then, using the fact that g(φ) is monotonically nondecreasing,4 for every
φ > φ¯ we have that
g(φ) > g(φ¯) = φ¯(1− f(φ¯)) = φ¯(1 + ε).
4Due to space constraints, we omit this standard verification.
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We can now use a multiplicative form of the Chernoff bounds in order to
show that if the fraction of red neighbors of a agent v is at least φ¯, then the
probability that the number of red neighbors of v in the next round is lower
than φ¯ is negligible. Formally, let c(t) be an arbitrary configuration such that
φmin > φ¯. First, note that due to g(φ) > g(φ¯), we have that
E
[
φ(t+1)v
∣∣∣ c(t)] > g(φmin) > g(φ¯) = φ¯(1 + ε).
Then, it follows that
P
(
φ(t+1)v < φ¯
∣∣∣ c(t)) = P(φ(t+1)v < φ¯(1 + ε) 11 + ε
∣∣∣∣ c(t))
= P
(
φ(t+1)v < φ¯(1 + ε)
(
1− ε
1 + ε
) ∣∣∣∣ c(t))
6 P
(
φ(t+1)v < E
[
φ(t+1)v
∣∣∣ c(t)](1− ε
1 + ε
) ∣∣∣∣ c(t))
= P
(
r(t+1)v < dvE
[
φ(t+1)v
∣∣∣ c(t)](1− ε
1 + ε
) ∣∣∣∣ c(t))
6 exp
(
−dv 1
3
φ¯(1 + ε)
(
1− ε
1 + ε
)2)
= e−Ω(dv) = e−ω(logn) = n−ω(1).
Applying the union bound over all the agents, we get
P
(
∃t∈poly(n)
∃v∈V : φ
(t+1)
v < φ¯
∣∣∣ c(t))
6
∑
t∈poly(n)
v∈V
P
(
φ(t+1)v < φ¯
∣∣∣ c(t)) = ∑
t∈poly(n)
v∈V
n−ω(1) = n−ω(1).
Thus, with high probability we have that φ
min
> φ¯ for every polynomial number
of rounds. Before we can use this to finish the proof, note that
∑
v∈B dv =∑
v∈V (dv − rv), by simply counting the number of blue endpoints of an edge in
two different ways. Using that φv > φmin > φ¯ for each v, we have
vol
(
B(t)
)
=
∑
v∈B
dv =
∑
v∈V
(dv − rv) =
∑
v∈V
dv
(
1− rv
dv
)
6 (1− φ¯)
∑
v∈V
dv =
1− 3p
4(1− p)vol(V ).
This means, the volume of the blue agents never exceeds a fraction of 1−3p4(1−p) of
the total volume of the graph w.h.p. 
Theorem 3.4 has several interesting implications on the behavior of the 2-
Choices dynamics on Core-Periphery networks which we describe in the remainder
of this section.
In the following, we always assume an initial configuration in which all
agents in the core C are blue and all agents in the periphery P are red. Now,
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let G = (V,E) be an (n, ε, cr, cd)-Core-Periphery network. Furthermore, let
qC = |N(u)∩P|/du be the probability that an agent u ∈ C picks a neighbor in the
periphery, and let qP = |N(v)∩C|/dv be the probability that an agent v ∈ P picks
a neighbor in the core. The relations below follow from Definition 3.1:
cr = |N(u) ∩ C| / |N(u) ∩ P| = (1− qC ) / qC ∀u ∈ C, (3)
cd = |N(v) ∩ C| / |N(v) ∩ P| = qP / (1− qP ) ∀v ∈ P. (4)
Let c? =
√
2−1
2 be the constant which later defines a threshold between
metastability and almost-consensus behavior. We get
cr = 1 / (c
? + δr) =⇒ qC = 3− 2
√
2 + δ′r (5)
cd = c
? + δd =⇒ qP = 3− 2
√
2 + δ′d (6)
for δr and δ′r (δd and δ′d) which are either both positive or both negative. We
can now prove a metastability phenomenon of the 2-Choices dynamics on Core-
Periphery networks.
Corollary 3.5. Let c? =
√
2−1
2 be a universal constant. Let G = (V,E) be an
(n, ε, cr, cd)-Core-Periphery network such that each agent in the network has
ω(log n) neighbors. Then, with high probability, we have that for each round t
and for any poly(n) number of rounds of the 2-Choices dynamics the following
two statements hold:
• if cr > 1/c? by a constant, then vol(B(t)) > 34vol(C)
• if cd < c? by a constant, then vol(R(t)) > 34vol(P)
where B(t) are the blue agents and R(t) the red agents at time t.
Proof sketch. Consider the following worst case scenario: Every time an agent
in the core (periphery) chooses a random neighbor belonging to the periphery
(core), then that neighbor is red (blue). In this scenario, the 2-Choices dynamics
can be thought of as two independent Biased-2-Choices(p, σ) in which for the
core p = qC and σ = red , and for the periphery p = qP and σ = blue. From
cr > 1/c? and cd < c? and Equations (5) and (6), it follows that qC and qP are
less than 3− 2√2. By applying the metastability result of Theorem 3.4, we get
that the volume of the adversary never exceeds 1−3p4(1−p) of the network’s volume.
Since both qC and qP are smaller than 3− 2
√
2, we have that 1−3p4(1−p) 6
1
4 (as the
inequality is tight for p = 0 and its value is decreasing). Thus, the volumes of
red (blue) agents in the core (periphery) are at most a fraction of 14 . Therefore,
the volumes of blue and red agents in the whole network are at least 34 of the
volumes of C and P, respectively. 
For the almost-consensus result, we require a high robustness of the core
such that it remains monochromatic for a logarithmic number of rounds. The
following lemma is needed to link the robustness with this property.
Lemma 3.6. Let ε and δ be two positive constants. Let G = (V,E) be a graph
of nε agents, and let 0 6 p 6 n−(ε+δ)/2. Starting from a configuration such
that each agent initially supports the blue color, within O(log(n)) rounds of the
Biased-2-Choices(p, red) no agent becomes red, w.h.p.
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Proof. The probability that an agent v changes its color to red at time t, given
that all the other agents are still blue, is
P
(
v ∈ R(t+1)
∣∣∣ V = B(t)) = p2 6 (n−(ε+δ)/2)2 = n−(ε+δ).
Applying the union bound over all the agents and over τ = O(log n) rounds, we
get
P
(
∃t6τ
∃v∈V : v ∈ R(t+1)
∣∣∣ V = B(t)) 6 nε · τ
nε+δ
= O(n−δ).
Thus, all agents in the graph remain blue for any logarithmic number of rounds,
w.h.p. 
If cr > n(ε+δ)/2, by Equation (3) it follows that
qC = 1 / (cr + 1) < 1 / cr 6 n−(ε+δ)/2.
Finally, we are ready to prove the almost-consensus behavior of the 2-Choices
dynamics on Core-Periphery networks.
Corollary 3.7. Let c? =
√
2−1
2 and let ε and δ be two positive constants. Let
G = (V,E) be an (n, ε, cr, cd)-Core-Periphery network such that each agent in
the network has ω(log n) neighbors. If cr > n(ε+δ)/2 and cd > c? by a constant,
then the agents reach a configuration such that the volume of blue agents is
(1− o(1))vol(V ) within O(log n) rounds of the 2-Choices dynamics, w.h.p.
Proof sketch. Since cr > n(ε+δ)/2, we can apply Lemma 3.6 and thus the agents in
the core never change color forO(log n) rounds, w.h.p. Therefore, for anyO(log n)
number of rounds, the process is equivalent to a Biased-2-Choices(qP , blue) run
by the periphery. Since cd > c? and thus qP > 3− 2
√
2 by Equation (6), we can
apply Theorem 3.4 and get almost-consensus on the blue color in a logarithmic
number of rounds, w.h.p. 
4 Experiments
In Section 3 we formally studied the 2-Choices dynamics on Core-Periphery
networks, observing a phase transition phenomenon that appears on a dominance
threshold c? =
√
2−1
2 . Here, we report the results of the empirical data obtained
by simulating the 2-Choices dynamics on real-world networks. Furthermore, we
discuss our results and compare them with our theoretical analysis. The source
code of the experiments is freely available.5
We simulated the 2-Choices dynamics on 70 real-world networks, 25 of
them taken from KONECT [Kun13] and 45 of them taken from SNAP [LK14].
Detailed information regarding the networks and the results of the experiments
are reported in Table 1. The networks chosen for the experiments are drawn
from a variety of domains including social networks, communication networks,
road networks, and web graphs; moreover, they range in size from thousands
of nodes and thousands of edges up to roughly one million of nodes and tens
of millions of edges. Before simulating the 2-Choices dynamics, we pre-process
5https://github.com/chaot4/opinion_dynamics_impl/releases/tag/AAMAS2018
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the networks in order to match the theoretical setting. In particular, for all the
networks, we remove the orientation of the edges and all loops, and we work on
the largest (w.r.t. the number of nodes) connected component.
Table 1: Experimental data. Source reports the source of the dataset, i.e.
SNAP (S) or KONECT (K). The values cr and cd are the robustness and
dominance obtained using the densest-core method; the values c¯r and c¯d are
the robustness and dominance obtained using the k-rich-club method. C and
P are the fraction of experiments in which the core’s and the periphery’s color
respectively spread to reach an almost-consensus, while M is the fraction of
experiments in which there is metastability, all having the core extracted with
the densest-core method. K stands for thousand, M for million.
Dataset (Source) |V | |E| cr (c¯r) cd (c¯d) C P M
Chicago (K) 0.8K 1.6K 6.55 (0.10) 0.15 (9.72) 0.00 0.00 1.00
email-Eu-core (S) 0.9K 32.1K 0.75 (0.53) 1.32 (1.88) 0.92 0.08 0.00
Euroroad (K) 1.0K 2.6K 5.53 (0.62) 0.18 (1.61) 0.00 0.00 1.00
Blogs (K) 1.2K 33.4K 0.62 (0.38) 1.57 (2.60) 0.00 0.00 1.00
Traffic Control (K) 1.2K 4.8K 1.25 (0.51) 0.78 (1.96) 0.00 0.00 1.00
Protein (K) 1.4K 3.8K 0.90 (0.33) 1.10 (2.95) 1.00 0.00 0.00
US Airport (K) 1.5K 34.4K 0.54 (0.48) 1.82 (2.10) 0.00 0.00 1.00
Stelzl (K) 1.6K 6.2K 1.03 (0.36) 0.96 (2.73) 1.00 0.00 0.00
Bible (K) 1.7K 18.1K 0.74 (0.54) 1.33 (1.84) 0.98 0.02 0.00
Hamster full (K) 2.0K 32.1K 0.96 (0.66) 1.02 (1.51) 1.00 0.00 0.00
Opsahl OF (K) 2.9K 31.2K 0.76 (0.55) 1.30 (1.81) 1.00 0.00 0.00
OpenFlights (K) 3.3K 38.4K 0.73 (0.50) 1.35 (1.98) 0.80 0.00 0.20
bitcoin-alpha (S) 3.7K 28.2K 0.53 (0.39) 1.87 (2.52) 1.00 0.00 0.00
ego-Facebook (S) 4.0K 176.4K 4.83 (1.53) 0.20 (0.65) 0.00 0.00 1.00
ca-GrQc (S) 4.1K 26.8K 3.33 (1.29) 0.29 (0.77) 0.00 0.00 1.00
US power grid (K) 4.9K 13.1K 3.17 (0.53) 0.31 (1.86) 0.00 0.00 1.00
bitcoin-otc (S) 5.8K 42.9K 0.52 (0.38) 1.88 (2.59) 1.00 0.00 0.00
p2p-Gnutella08 (S) 6.2K 41.5K 1.20 (0.53) 0.82 (1.86) 0.00 1.00 0.00
Route Views (K) 6.4K 25.1K 0.30 (0.16) 3.26 (6.13) 0.96 0.04 0.00
wiki-Vote (S) 7.0K 201.4K 0.60 (0.44) 1.64 (2.24) 1.00 0.00 0.00
p2p-Gnutella09 (S) 8.1K 52.0K 1.08 (0.53) 0.91 (1.86) 0.00 1.00 0.00
ca-HepPh (S) 8.6K 49.6K 1.40 (0.69) 0.71 (1.44) 1.00 0.00 0.00
p2p-Gnutella06 (S) 8.7K 63.0K 0.91 (0.53) 1.09 (1.87) 1.00 0.00 0.00
p2p-Gnutella05 (S) 8.8K 63.6K 0.93 (0.54) 1.06 (1.83) 0.86 0.14 0.00
PGP (K) 10.6K 48.6K 2.54 (1.18) 0.39 (0.84) 1.00 0.00 0.00
p2p-Gnutella04 (S) 10.8K 79.9K 0.91 (0.52) 1.08 (1.90) 1.00 0.00 0.00
ca-HepTh (S) 11.2K 235.2K 3.49 (2.39) 0.28 (0.41) 0.00 0.00 1.00
ca-AstroPh (S) 17.9K 393.9K 1.54 (0.84) 0.64 (1.18) 1.00 0.00 0.00
ca-CondMat (S) 21.3K 182.5K 1.70 (0.68) 0.58 (1.46) 1.00 0.00 0.00
p2p-Gnutella25 (S) 22.6K 109.3K 0.72 (0.41) 1.37 (2.43) 1.00 0.00 0.00
E.A.T. (K) 23.1K 594.1K 0.60 (0.48) 1.64 (2.07) 0.96 0.04 0.00
Cora citation (K) 23.1K 178.3K 1.37 (0.54) 0.72 (1.83) 1.00 0.00 0.00
CAIDA (K) 26.4K 106.7K 0.31 (0.16) 3.13 (6.03) 1.00 0.00 0.00
p2p-Gnutella24 (S) 26.4K 130.7K 0.71 (0.42) 1.39 (2.34) 1.00 0.00 0.00
cit-HepTh (S) 27.4K 704.0K 1.33 (0.74) 0.74 (1.34) 1.00 0.00 0.00
Digg (K) 29.6K 169.5K 0.59 (0.49) 1.67 (2.01) 1.00 0.00 0.00
Linux (K) 30.8K 426.4K 0.47 (0.24) 2.10 (4.14) 0.90 0.10 0.00
email-Enron (S) 33.6K 361.6K 0.71 (0.54) 1.39 (1.84) 1.00 0.00 0.00
cit-HepPh (S) 34.4K 841.5K 1.34 (0.61) 0.74 (1.61) 1.00 0.00 0.00
Internet topology (K) 34.7K 215.4K 0.61 (0.32) 1.62 (3.08) 0.88 0.00 0.12
p2p-Gnutella30 (S) 36.6K 176.6K 0.82 (0.44) 1.21 (2.23) 1.00 0.00 0.00
loc-Brightkite (S) 56.7K 425.8K 0.99 (0.71) 1.00 (1.40) 1.00 0.00 0.00
p2p-Gnutella31 (S) 62.5K 295.7K 0.78 (0.44) 1.27 (2.26) 1.00 0.00 0.00
soc-Epinions1 (S) 75.8K 811.4K 0.72 (0.60) 1.37 (1.65) 1.00 0.00 0.00
Slashdot081106 (S) 77.3K 937.1K 0.51 (0.46) 1.93 (2.13) 0.98 0.02 0.00
soc-Slashdot0811 (S) 77.3K 938.3K 0.51 (0.46) 1.93 (2.13) 1.00 0.00 0.00
ego-Twitter (S) 81.3K 2.6M 1.12 (0.57) 0.89 (1.75) 0.00 0.00 1.00
Slashdot090216 (S) 81.8K 995.3K 0.53 (0.48) 1.87 (2.08) 1.00 0.00 0.00
Slashdot090221 (S) 82.1K 1.0M 0.53 (0.48) 1.87 (2.08) 1.00 0.00 0.00
soc-Slashdot0922 (S) 82.1K 1.0M 0.53 (0.47) 1.87 (2.08) 1.00 0.00 0.00
Prosper loans (K) 89.1K 6.6M 0.82 (0.47) 1.21 (2.10) 0.00 0.00 1.00
Livemocha (K) 104.1K 4.3M 0.47 (0.38) 2.10 (2.56) 0.94 0.06 0.00
Flickr (K) 105.7K 4.6M 2.27 (1.07) 0.43 (0.92) 0.00 0.00 1.00
ego-Gplus (S) 107.6K 24.4M 0.95 (0.54) 1.04 (1.82) 0.00 0.00 1.00
epinions (S) 119.1K 1.4M 0.64 (0.52) 1.53 (1.89) 1.00 0.00 0.00
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Dataset (Source) |V | |E| cr (c¯r) cd (c¯d) C P M
Github (K) 120.8K 879.7K 0.88 (0.70) 1.12 (1.41) 1.00 0.00 0.00
Bookcrossing (K) 185.9K 867.2K 0.52 (0.34) 1.90 (2.87) 1.00 0.00 0.00
loc-Gowalla (S) 196.5K 1.9M 1.14 (0.80) 0.87 (1.24) 0.02 0.00 0.98
email-EuAll (S) 224.8K 679.8K 0.16 (0.06) 6.19 (14.4) 0.00 0.00 1.00
web-Stanford (S) 255.2K 3.8M 2.52 (0.37) 0.39 (2.68) 0.00 0.00 1.00
amazon0302 (S) 262.1K 1.7M 2.61 (0.44) 0.38 (2.23) 1.00 0.00 0.00
com-DBLP (S) 317.0K 2.0M 1.43 (0.70) 0.69 (1.42) 1.00 0.00 0.00
web-NotreDame (S) 325.7K 2.1M 2.63 (0.60) 0.37 (1.65) 0.00 0.00 1.00
com-amazon (S) 334.8K 1.8M 1.72 (0.32) 0.57 (3.03) 0.98 0.00 0.02
amazon0312 (S) 400.7K 4.6M 2.18 (0.41) 0.45 (2.41) 0.00 0.00 1.00
amazon0601 (S) 403.3K 4.8M 2.08 (0.40) 0.47 (2.44) 0.00 0.00 1.00
amazon0505 (S) 410.2K 4.8M 2.01 (0.41) 0.49 (2.40) 0.00 0.00 1.00
web-BerkStan (S) 654.7K 13.1M 1.60 (0.43) 0.62 (2.30) 0.00 0.00 1.00
web-Google (S) 855.8K 8.5M 1.77 (0.42) 0.56 (2.33) 0.00 0.00 1.00
roadNet-PA (S) 1.0M 3.0M 7.35 (1.01) 0.13 (0.98) 0.00 0.00 1.00
The first issue we faced simulating the 2-Choices dynamics was the extraction
of the set of agents representing the core. In fact, there is no exact definition
of what a good core is with respect to dominance and robustness values. We
started by using a simple heuristic to extract the core, namely the k-rich-club
method [ZM04]: This method establishes the core C as the set of k agents with
highest degree and the periphery P as the remaining agents. Avin et al. [ALP+14]
empirically show that when k is at the symmetry point, i.e. k is chosen such that
vol(C) ≈ vol(P), the core found by this method is sublinear in size with respect
to the number of agents of the network. We remark that if vol(C) = vol(P) then,
from the definitions of robustness and dominance, it follows that cr = 1/cd.
We initially used the k-rich-club method to extract the core but noticed
that this simple heuristic produces a core with very low robustness values,
contrary to what common sense would suggest to be a good core. In particular,
low robustness values imply that the dominance values never go below our
theoretical threshold c? (see columns c¯r and c¯d in Table 1), which hinders
the comparison between theoretical and experimental results. Indeed, in our
theoretical analysis we assume that the core never changes color, i.e. that the
robustness is high; however, in the experiments the core was very unstable when
using the k-rich-club method. The main issue of this method is that it does
not take into account the topological structure of the network: For example, if
we consider a regular graph with a well defined core-periphery structure (which
satisfies Definition 3.1), the k-rich-club method would identify the core to be a
random subset of nodes.
Therefore, we introduce a novel heuristic for extracting the core which takes
the network topology into account by prioritizing the robustness of the core over
its dominance. The procedure, which we refer to as densest-core method, is
described in Algorithm 1. Informally, it iteratively extracts the densest subgraph
from the network and adds it to the core unless the core’s volume becomes
too large. In order to compute this constrained densest subgraph, it uses a
variation of the 2-approximation algorithm [Cha00], which chooses every time
the densest subgraph that will not make the core’s volume larger than the
periphery’s volume.
We apply the densest-core method to the networks and, as expected, we
obtain higher robustness and lower dominance values compared to the k-rich-club
method. The data reported in Table 1 shows that the robustness of the core
extracted by our method is higher in all the considered datasets but one. Indeed,
we finally obtain dominance values below the theoretical threshold c?.
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Algorithm 1 Densest-Core Extraction.
1: procedure DensestCore(G)
2: C? ← ∅
3: do
4: C ← ∅; D ← G
5: while D 6= ∅ do
6: v ← LowestDegreeNode(D)
7: D ← D \ {v}
8: if Density(D) > Density(C) and
FractionOfVolume(C? ∪D) 6 1/2 then
9: C ← D
10: end if
11: end while
12: C? ← C? ∪ C
13: G← G \ C
14: while C 6= ∅
15: return C?
We proceed as follows: We initialize all the agents in C with blue and all
the agents in P with red. Then, we simulate the 2-Choices dynamics on each
network, keeping track of the volumes of blue and red agents in each iteration.
We consider a simulation metastable if within |V | iterations – waiting for a
superpolynomial number of rounds would be infeasible – neither the red nor the
blue agents reach a volume greater than 95% of the network’s volume. Otherwise,
we declare almost-consensus on the majority’s color. The experiments were
repeated 50 times for each network.
As can be observed in Figure 1, there exists an empirical threshold σ = 1/2
which is different from the theoretical one. In fact, in 86% of the datasets
with a dominance below the threshold, the 2-Choices dynamics ends up in a
phase of metastability, while in 81% of the datasets with a dominance above
the threshold the 2-Choices dynamics converges to an almost-consensus. The
empirical threshold is greater than the theoretical threshold because of several
factors: i) in the experiments the core actually changes color to a small extent
(while in the theoretical part we ignored such small perturbations), and it
consequently lowers the probability for an agent in the periphery to pick the
core’s color; ii) the real-world network we used in the experiments do not have
the regularity assumptions of the networks that we consider in the analysis; iii)
in the experiments we declare metastability only after |V | iterations and this
increases the likelihood of metastable runs. The gap between the theoretical
and the empirical threshold should be closed in future work by providing a more
fine-grained theoretical analysis which does not assume the adversary’s color to
be monochromatic and considers more general networks.
We want to highlight that the protocol’s convergence to the core’s color (as
shown in Table 1) is remarkable in light of the fact that the densest-core method
ensures that the sum of the agents’ degrees of the core and of the periphery
are equal. More precisely, notice that equal volumes of core and periphery,
starting from an initial configuration where two sets support different colors, is
sufficient in the Voter Model to say that the two initial colors have the same
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Figure 1: Metastability and almost-consensus of the experiments compared
to the theoretical and empirical thresholds c? and σ. The 86% of the runs
are metastable when cd < σ; in 81% of them there is an almost-consensus if
cd > σ. The value t is the arithmetic mean of the number of rounds until
almost-consensus/metastability was declared.
probability to be the one eventually supported by all agents [HP01], regardless
of the topological structure. Previous works on the 2-Choices dynamics [CER14]
provided convergence results which are parametrized only in the difference of
the volumes of the two sets, suggesting a similar behavior. Our experimental
results highlight the insufficiency of the initial volume distribution as an accurate
predictive parameter, showing that the topological structure of the core plays a
decisive role.
5 Conclusions
We analyzed the 2-Choices dynamics on a class of networks with core-periphery
structure, where the core, a small group of densely interconnected agents, initially
holds a different opinion from the rest of the network, the periphery. We formally
proved that a phase-transition phenomenon occurs: Depending on the dominance
parameter cd characterizing the connectivity of the network, either the core’s
opinion spreads among the agents of the periphery and the network reaches
an (almost-)consensus, or there is a metastability phase in which none of the
opinions prevails over the other.
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We validated our theoretical results on several real-world networks. Intro-
ducing an efficient and effective method to extract the core, we showed that
the same parameter cd is sufficient to predict the convergence/metastability of
the 2-Choices dynamics most of the time. Surprisingly, even if the volumes
of core and periphery are equal, the core’s opinion wins in most of the cases.
These behaviors suggest that in many real-world networks there actually is a
core whose initial opinion has a great advantage of spreading in simple opinion
dynamics such as the 2-Choices. We think that these results are a relevant step
towards understanding which dynamical properties are implicitly responsible
for causing social and economic agents to form networks with a core-periphery
structure.
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